COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME
COURT'S SERVICE RULE ON THE COMPETENCE
OF THE COUNTY DISTRICT COURTS AND THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the amendment which became effective on September 8,
1975, the New Jersey supreme court rule governing the manner of
service of process for the county district courts provided that
"[s]ervice of process shall be made in accordance with R. 4:4-4 or,
if applicable, R. 4:4-5 [service rules for the superior court], except ...
in landlord and tenant actions."' Apparently because the county
district court service rule incorporated by reference certain provisions of the superior court service rules, the issue arose as to whether
the county district courts could generallyl obtain jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants. 2 Then, in Beca Realty, Inc. v. Eisberg,a
the Bergen County District Court concluded that the references in
the county district court service rule to the superior court rules
merely provided for substituted or constructive service in this state,
and did not give the county district courts the ability to obtain jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. 4 In addition, the Beca Realty
court was of the opinion that adoption of the superior court long-arm
rule would change the county district courts from legislative courts of
limited jurisdiction to courts coequal to the constitutional courts of
5
general jurisdiction.
Although one commentator had characterized the Beca Realty
opinion as "persuasive," 6 the case was overruled by the appellate division in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Katzmann. 7 The Sears court rejected the Beca Realty analysis, relying instead on what was termed
N.J.R. 6:2-3(b).
Cf. Roth v. Jackson, 99 N.J. Super. 546, 549-50, 240 A.2d 687, 689 (App. Div.),
cert. denied, 52 N.J. 161, 244 A.2d 293 (1968).
The county district courts were already able to obtain jurisdiction over defendants
residing outside of the county pursuant to specific statutory exceptions. See notes 57-61
infra and accompanying text.
3 125 N.J. Super. 575, 312 A.2d 516 (Bergen County Dist. Ct.
1973).
4 Id. at 582, 312 A.2d at 520.
5 Id. at 584, 312 A.2d at 520-21.
6 R. MCDONOUGH, COUNTY DISTRICT AND MUNICIPAL COURTS,
17 N.J. PRACTICE
§ 252 (Supp. 1974).
7 137 N.J. Super. 106, 109, 348 A.2d 193, 195 (App. Div. 1975).
2
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the "purely procedural" nature of the long-arm rule. 8 By thus characterizing the rule, the appellate division was able to conclude that
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant could constitutionally be obtained by county district courts under Winberry v. Salisbury,9 which
held that the supreme court's rulemaking power over practice and
procedure "is not subject to overriding legislation.' 10 The Sears court
buttressed its conclusion by quoting the service rule amendment,
which, although not vet effective at that time, was in accord with the
Sears interpretation." The rule governing the manner of service of
process for the countv district courts, as amended, now provides that
[s]ervice of' process within this State shall be made in accordance

With R. 4:4-4 (a), (b), or (c) as applicable, or as otherwise provided
by court order consistent with due process of law, or in accordance
with R. 4:4-5, except . . .in landlord and tenant actions .... Sub-

stituted or constructive service outside this State ma' be made
pursuant to the applicable provisions in R. 4:4-4 or R. 4:4-5.12

The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the validity and the
ramifications of this result. If the service rule amendment is "purely
procedural," then the supreme court's ability to treat the subject by
rule is bevond dispute. If, however, the service rule amendment is
outside of the scope of procedure, then the supreme court's service
rule amendment is invalid, and its approval by the Sears court is
incorrect. In order to analyze and evaluate the true nature of the
service rule amendment, and how the amendment interacts with the
statutory scheme of the county district courts, this Comment will
speak in terms of the "competence" of courts as opposed to the jurisdiction of courts.
Competence is defined as "the power of a court to adjudicate a
particular controversy."" This concept, which is more often used in
civil law countries 1 4 although gaining acceptance in the United
States,15 is further subdivided into general competence and specific
8 Id. at 109, 348 A.2d at 194.
9 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
10 137 N.J. Super. at 109, 348 A.2d at 194-95 (citing 5 N.J. at 255, 74 A.2d at 414).
11 137 N.J. Super. at 109-10 n.1, 348 A.2d at 195.
12 N.J.R. 6:2-3(b).
13 Address by Hans Smit, American Foreign Law Association Annual Meeting, April
14, 1961, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 164, 167 (1961). See Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments, 41 COLUM, L. REv. 221, 221-22 (1941).
14 Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An
Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 335, 338-40 (1972).

,5Id. at 340. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 105 (1971).
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competence.16 General competence "defines generally when the
courts have in personaim powers. "17 In this respect it is equivalent to
a consideration of what parties can be subjected by the state to the
processes of its courts within the confines of due process of law. General competence, therefore, can be properly conceptualized as in personata jurisdiction.18 Specific competence, on the other hand, describes "what particutar court may hear a particular controversy. "'19
Since specific competence has reference to a particular court's power,
this concept is composed of the particular subject matter that a court
has within its cognizance, and the particular parties that a court may
bind by its decisions. 20 Thus, specific competence is a hybrid concept
by virtue of its reference to both the subject matter and the persons
who may be properly brought before a particular court. 2 Tltis Comment will use the term "competence" rather than "specific competence"; however, it will be essential to keep in mind that the focus of
"competence" is on the particular court, and not upon the
general
judicial power of the state, which is general competence or jurisdiction.
There are many reasons which may motivate a state to limit the
competence of particular courts:
Among these are the desire to have an adjudicating body with special knowledge and expertise, the historical development of a special court for certain matters, [or] the desire to relegate relatively
22
minor matters to special courts with simplified proceedings ....
16 Smit, supra note 13, at 167; Smit, supra note 14, at 340.

17 Sinit, supra note 14, at 340 (emphasis in original).
18 See id.
19 Sinit, supra note 13, at 167 (emphasis added).
20 M.

ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN &

H. SMIT, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

144

(2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as ROSENBERG, WEINSTEIN & SMIT]; Nussbaum, supra
note 13, at 221 n.I. In ROSENBERG, WEINSTEIN & SMIT, supra at 145, the following
conceptual chart is given:
Federal or State Court
Judicial Jurisdiction

Subject Matter

In personam, in rem,
and quasi-in-rem

Competence

Subject Matter

In personam, in rem,
and quasi-in-rem

21 ROSENBERG, WEINSTEIN & SMIT, supra note 20, at 144.
2

2 Id. at 147.
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Therefore, a court may lack the competence to hear cases involving
particular matters or persons, not because the state is without power
to decide the controversy, but because the state has not delegated
that power to that court.2 3 This is more than mere semantics. The
Restatement of the Law of Judgments and the Restatement (Second)
of the Conflict of Laws both state that unless a judgment is rendered
by a competent court, that judgment is void and subject to collateral
24
attack in the state of rendition and in sister states.
HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE COUNTY DISTRICT COURTS

New Jersey has long placed the judicial power in both constitutional and legislative courts.25 For example, the state constitution of
1844 vested the judicial power in certain specified courts
and such inferior courts as

now exist,

and as may be hereafter or-

dained and established by law; which inferior courts the legislature
26
nay alter or abolish, as the public good shall require.

City district courts, the forerunners of the present count\, district
27
courts, were such inferior courts created by the legislature.
The first city district courts, the District Courts of the City of
Newark, were esablished in 1873.28 These courts were vested with
"the civil jurisdiction heretofore exercised by or conferred
upon justices of the peace, within the corporate limits of the city of Newark"
under certain enumerated acts: "the trial of small causes," landlord
23 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7, comment a at 41 (1942). Indeed, the state

need not have delegated that power to any of its courts. Id.
24 Id. at 41-42; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 105 & comment
a at 316 (1971). For a discussion of the term "collateral attack" see note 92 Iifra.
25 A constitutional

ferred b

court is one which is created and its jurisdiction expressly conthe constitution. Its powers and its jurisdiction are, therefore, "ilnmutab[le]

* . . except by a change in the organic law itself."
Mayor & City Council v. Hussey, 70
N.J.L. 244, 247-48, 57 A. 1086-88 (Ct. Err. & App. 1904). See also Flanigan v. Cuggenheim Smelting Co., 63 N.J.L. 647, 651. 44 A. 762, 763 (Ct. Err. & App. 1899). A
legislative or inferior court is one established by the legislature pursuant to a general
constitutional grant of power. The legislature's ability to establish and control the
character of such courts "includes the authority to enlarge or diminish the powers of
any such inferior court." In re Kellner, 11 N.J. Misc. 201, 206, 165 A. 585, 588 (Essex
County Sur. Ct. 1932).

26 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 1,
1 (1844).
27 Perhaps an even earlier ancestor of the county district courts was the Mercantile

Court of the City of Newark. See Law of Apr. 9, 1868, ch. 414, [1868] N.J. Laws 942
(repealed 1869). The territorial jurisdiction of this court was the city limits. Id. § 3. It
administered the same functions previously exercised by the justices of the peace, including hearing all small claims, id. § 9, at 944, and cases brought to recover a penalty
for violation of Newark ordinances, id. § 10.
28

R. MCDONOUGH, COUNTY DISTRICT AND XIUNICIPAL COURTS,

17 N.J. PRACTICE

§ 3, at 4 (1971). See Law of Mar. 4, 1873, ch. 119, [1873] N.J. Laws 245 (repealed 1898).
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and tenant matters, "relief' of creditors against absconding and absent
debtors," and "forcible entries and detainers." 29 Significantly, the
civil jurisdiction of these district courts was "exclusive of all other
courts whatsoever .

.

.

where the parties, plaintiff and defendant,

30
both reside within the corporate limits of the city of Newark."Thus, the statute made it clear that the legislative intent in establishing these courts was to provide a forum for local litigants to bring and
defend actions of a strictly local nature. The Newark district court
system apparently worked so well that in 1877 the legislature provided for the establishment of similar courts in other cities with a
specified minimunm population. 31
During the following twenty-one years the legislature passed
numerous acts and amendments affecting the district court system 32
Because these laws were sprinkled throughout the various statute
books, a major revision of the district court legislation was executed
in 1898.33 The "sundry acts relative to district courts" were all
repealed, 3 4 and the revision became the sole exposition regarding
practice in the district courts.
The scheme of the district courts under the revision of 1898 was
not significantly different from that which had evolved prior to that
date. All district courts already in existence were continued; two district courts were established in cities having over one hundred
thousand inhabitants and one court for cities having over twenty
thousand inhabitants. 3 5 In addition, the legislature established the
boundaries of the jurisdiction of these courts in various manners.
First, the legislature specifically defined the territorial jurisdictional

29 Law of Mar. 4, 1873, ch. 119, § 5, [1873] N.J. Laws 246.
30 Id. § 6, at 246-47.

31 Law of Mar. 9, 1877, ch. 150, [1877] N.J. Laws 234 (repealed 1898). This act provided that one city district court be established in every city having fifteen thousand inhabitants, and two courts in cities having one hundred thousand inhabitants. Id. § 2.
32 Many of these acts merely changed the minimum population requirements for the
establishment of a district court. See, e.g., Law of Mar. 26, 1896, ch. 108, [1896] N.J.
Laws 161 (repealed 1898) (twenty thousand inhabitants); Law of Mar. 8, 1892, ch. 43,
[1892] N.J. Laws 64 (repealed 1898) (nineteen thousand inhabitants). Other amendments dealt with procedural or administrative matters such as the manner of taking an
appeal or the terms of office for judges. See, e.g., Law of Mar. 24, 1892, ch. 148, [1892]
N.J. Laws 257 (repealed 1898) (procedure for appeal); Law of Mar. 2, 1891, ch. 27,
[1891] N.J. Laws 64 (repealed 1898) (appointment of judges for five-year term). One
significant change broadened the jurisdiction of the city district courts to the boundaries
of the county in which the court was located. Law of Feb. 9, 1886, ch. 7, [1886] N.J.
Laws 16 (repealed 1898).
33 Law of June 14, 1898, ch. 228, [1898] N.J. Laws 556 (repealed 1951).
'4 Law of June 14, 1898, ch. 229, [1898] N.J. Laws 638.
35 Law of June 14, 1898, ch. 228, § 1, [1898] N.J. Laws 556.
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boundaries as "co-extensive with the limits of the county wherein the
city is situated in which such district court is established."3 6 Second,
the subject-matter jurisdiction was extended to "[e]very suit of a civil
nature at law," provided that the recovery was limited to $300. 3 7 The
courts were precluded from hearing actions concerning the title to
land, but were given jurisdiction over landlord and tenant matters,
actions of forcible entry and detainer, and suits for replevin and
attachment. 38 In addition, the district court judges were delegated
39
the power to make uniform rules for practice within their courts.
Subsequent amendments to this act effected only minor changes
in the district courts. For example, the most frequent type of
amendment merely changed the threshold population requirement
necessary to have district courts established in a particular city or
judicial district. 40 By the time of the judicial reorganization in 1948,
district courts had been established in every county of the state. 4 1 In
1948 the constitutional court system was substantially overhauled.
But, as in 1844, the new Judicial Article, in the section dealing with
"legislative control over inferior courts," provided in part that "[tihe
inferior courts and their jurisdiction may from time to time be established, altered or abolished by law."-42 Pursuant to an exercise of this
grant of power, the legislature continued the previously existing district courts, and all such courts became known as county district
courts. 43

The present county district courts reflect the same legislative intent to provide courts of a local character as those created a century
ago. The number of judges appointed to the district court bench is
36

Id. § 29,

37

Id. § 30.

8

Id.
Id. §

at 564.

16, at 559.
See, e.g., Law of June 24, 1929, ch. 353, [1929] N.J. Laws 789 (one court in cities
having 17,000 inhabitants; two courts in cities having 135,000 inhabitants); Law of Mar.
4, 1924, ch. 31, [1924] N.J. Laws 66-67 (one court in cities having 22,000 inhabitants;
two courts in cities having 150,000 inhabitants); Law of Mar. 22, 1899, ch. 91, [1899]
N.J. Laws 220-21 (one court in cities having 20,000 inhabitants; one court in cities
having less than 20,000 inhabitants, with city council approval; two courts in cities having 100,000 inhabitants).
Judicial districts were first used in 1908. See Law of Apr. 1, 1908, ch.49, [1908] N.J.
Laws 70. Pursuant to this act, one or more municipalities within a county could combine to meet the population requirement for the establishment of a district court and
petition the legislature for approval by special act. Id. § 1, at 70-71.
4' Law of July 27, 1948, ch. 264, § 2, [1948] N.J. Laws 1146.
42 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 1,
1. Compare id. with N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 1, 1 (1844).
43 Law of Sept. 10, 1948, ch. 384, [1948] N.J. Laws 1564 (corresponds to N.J.
STAT.
ANN. § 2A:6-1 (1952)).
39

40
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determined by the class and population of the county in which the
district court sits.44 The amount in controversy in civil suits is limited
to $3,000.45 Some district courts are now subdivided to include a
division of small claims and a landlord and tenant division. 4 6 The
jurisdictional limitation on the amount in controversy in the small
claims division is set at $500.47 The landlord and tenant division provides an easily accessible forum in which to bring summary dispossess
actions.4 8 The procedures followed in both divisions are purposely
informal so that lay citizens can often prosecute their own claims. 4 9
The character of the district courts is further evidenced by the
cost schedule and the practice rules established for these courts. The
legislature controls the costs in all courts, 50 and the filing fees in
county district court are significantly lower than those in the superior
court. 5 1 Time and expense are saved by statutes discouraging the use
of stenographers and juries on this level. 52 In addition, the supreme
court has also helped to streamline practice in the county district
courts by providing for substantially shorter time periods for most
phases of litigation than those available in the superior court. 53 As the
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-2.1 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76).
45 Id. § 2A:6-34. The county district courts are granted
jurisdiction in such cases where several distinct separate claims are made and
asserted in one action on separate counts or otherwise, notwithstanding that the
said claims in the aggregate shall exceed $3,000.00 exclusive of costs, provided
none of the separate distinct claims shall exceed $3,000.00.
Id. § 2A:6-34.1. Where the "amount really due or recoverable" is greater than $3,000,
recovery of $3,000 in a county district court "shall bar the recovery of the residue .. .in
any court whatsoever." Id. § 2A:6-35(a).
" A division of small claims can be created within a county district court by the
county freeholders. Id. § 2A:6-41 (1952). Landlord and tenant actions fall within the
court's general jurisdiction. Id. § 2A:6-34(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
47 Law of May 1, 1975, ch. 72, [19751 N.J. SEss. L. SERV. 102, amending N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:6-43 (Supp. 1975-76).
48 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-51 et seq. (1952), as amended, (Supp. 1975-76).
49 See N.J. Dep't of Community Affairs, Small Claims: How to File and Defend a
Suit in the New Jersey Small Claims Division, rev. ed. July 1973.
50 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 22A:1-1 et seq. (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1975-76).
51 Compare id. § 22A:2-37 (Supp. 1975-76) (complaints $8 to $10, counterclaims $7
to $9 in county district court) with id. § 22A:2-6 (complaints $60, other papers $30 in
superior court, law division).
52 See id. § 2A:18-15 (1952) (party requesting stenographer must bear expense); id.
§ 22A:2-37 (Supp. 1975-76) (party demanding jury trial must pay fee).
53For example, in the county district courts, N.J.R. 6:3-1(2) provides for a 30-day
period to raise certain defenses by motion or to institute cross-claims. In the superior
court, N.J.R. 4:6-3 provides for certain defenses to be raised by motion within 90 days
of filing an answer, and N.J.R. 4: 7 -5(c) provides for the assertion of cross-claims within
90 days.
N.J.R. 4:6-1(a) requires that a defendant in the superior court file an answer within
20 days, or 35 days if service of the summons and complaint is made out of state.
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appellate division summarized in Andriola v. Galloping Hill Shopping
54
Center, Inc.,
[t]he statutory scheme for the county district courts, as supplemented by the court rules, is designed to establish a streamlined
structure and practice for the inexpensive and expeditious disposition of the many relatively minor personal injury, property damage
and commercial causes which make up the vast bulk of the litiga55
tion in this State.

Therefore, when these attributes are coupled with the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the county district courts, it is clear that the legislature
intended these courts to be a forum wherein small matters could be

adjudicated in a manner requiring less time, less money, and less
formality than is mandated by the character and practice of the constitutional courts.
In addition, it is clear the legislature intended that the matters
heard by the county district courts should be of a local nature since
service of process is generally limited to the county borders5 6 with
only specific statutory exceptions. One such exception provides that
where there are multiple defendants, one of whom can be properly
served within the county limits, codefendants and third-party defendants can be served in another county. 5 7 A second statutory exception

exists by which out-of-county defendants inay be brought into court
by substituted service upon various state officials. 5 8 Finally, other
Further, N.J.R. 4:6-1(c) permits the parties to consent to an extension of up to 30 days
in which to file a responsive pleading. In the county district courts, N.J.R. 6:3-1(1)
pi Uliits
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permits a defendant litigating pro se to answer merely by appearing. In addition, N.J.R.
6:3-1(4) prohibits the filing of answers in landlord and tenant summary actions and
certain actions brought in the small claims division.
In the superior court, "interrogatories shall be served within 40 clays after the expiration of the time allowed for service of the last permissible responsive pleading as to
each defendant." N.J.R. 4:17-2. Answers to interrogatories must be made within 60 days.
N.J.R. 4:17-4(b). In the county district court, the periods for serving and answering
interrogatories are each shortened to 30 days. N.J.R. 6:4-3(a). To reinstate an action dismissed for failure to answer interrogatories within the prescribed time period, a party
must pay a $25 fee in the county district court, N.J.R. 6:4-3(a), and a $50 fee in the
superior court, N.J.R. 4:23-5(a). Discovery must be completed in a superior court
action within 150 days, N.J.R. 4:24-1, while this time limit in the county district court
is reduced to 100 days, N.J.R. 6:4-5.
5493 N.J. Super. 196, 225 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1966).
55Id. at 200, 225 A.2d at 380.
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-32 (1952).
57Id. § 2A:6-33 (Supp. 1975-76).
5 See id. § 2A: 15-35 (jurisdiction over foreign corporations and associations may be
obtained by serving the Secretary of State or the Commissioner of Banking and In-
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statutes allow service, in limited instances, upon out-of-county land59
lords who own rental property in the county where suit is brought.
These legislative exceptions only extend service out of county, not out
auof state. Nowhere does the legislature explicitly or implicitly
60
thorize service of process directly upon out-of-state parties.
THE COMPETENCE OF THE COUNTY DISTRICT COURTS:
JUDICIAL TREATMENT

Contrary to the legislative scheme discussed above, the service
rule amendment for the county district courts expressly provides for
service of process out of state. This conflict admits of no easy resolution since it involves two separate constitutional grants of power. On
the one hand, the legislature is constitutionally granted the power to
create and change inferior courts such as the county district courts, 6 1
while on the other hand, the supreme court is constitutionally
granted the unchecked power over practice and procedure. 6 2 Although
one might tend to overlook such a problem since the service rule
does embody a rational state policy, 6 3 this conflict must be resolved

surance); id. § 39:7-1 et seq. (1973) (jurisdiction over nonresident motorists may be
obtained by serving the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles).
59 Law of Oct. 15, 1975, ch. 227, [1975] N.J. SESS. L. SERV. 598 (service of process
allowed upon individual out-of-county landlord in action for return of security deposit);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-31 (Supp. 1975-76) (in tenant's action against landlord for failure to comply with the statement-of-information requirements of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46:8-28, -29, service may be made by mail "upon the record owner at the last address listed in the tax records of either the municipality or county" and is effective
against the landlord whether or not he is served in the county where the court is sitting).
60 Where out-of-state parties are brought into county district court proceedings, it
has been done by means ojf substituted service made upon in-state public officials. See
note 58 supra and accompanying text.
61 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 1,
1.
62 Id. art. 6, § 2,
3. This is the interpretation given the provision in Winberry v.
Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
63 On its face, the new rule establishes a system whereby out-of-state defendants
may be served with process from the plaintiff's home county district court, whereas an
in-state defendant residing in a county other than that in which the suit was instituted
may not be so served. In the extreme, this creates a situation where service may be
made upon a defendant thousands of miles away while it might be impossible to effect
service upon a defendant residing in a neighboring community. Although this appears
to be an anomalous result, it does reflect a rational state policy, i.e., favoring in-state
litigants over nonresidents. In-state defendants are favored in that they need only defend county district court suits in their home county, while in-state plaintiffs are given
priority in that they are now entitled to bring suit in their home county district courts
against out-of-state defendants. The nature of the suits brought in these courts is amenable to this policy. In such minor actions, the in-state defendant need not be inconvenienced by having to defend in a foreign forum. On the other hand, the state has little
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because the enforceability of county district court default judgments
is directly in issue.
In an action brought to enforce a foreign judgment in a defendant's home forum, the judgment must be accorded full faith and
credit 64 unless it can be attacked for lack of competency of the
rendering court6 5 or for other defects. 66 In this regard, it is essential
to keep in mind the distinction between the concepts of jurisdiction
and competency. Jurisdiction refers to the power of a state to subject
a person or property to its legal process. 67 Competency, however, is
the power of a particularcourt to decide an action. 6 8 The crux of the
problem presented by the service rule amendment is the competency
of the county district courts; unless a particular court is granted the
power over both the subject matter and the person, a procedure providing for the assertion of that power is meaningless.
The competency of all New Jersey courts is conferred directly or
indirectly by the constitution. The competency of the constitutional
courts is conferred by the document itself, whereas the competency
of the inferior courts is conferred by the legislature, acting pursuant
to a constitutional grant of power. 69 Therefore, to determine the
competency of an inferior court to decide a particular matter, inquiry
concern for the convenience of an out-of-state party who passes through the state leaving behind a trail of minor actions.
64 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
The purpose of this provision is to place "the Constitution behind a judgment instead of
the too fluid, ill-defined concept of 'comity.' " Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,
228 (1945) (footnote omitted).
65 IESTATEMENI OF jUDGMENTS§ 7& comment a at 42 (!949).
66 See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948) (lack of in personam jurisdiction); Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 627-28 (1947) (judgment in first
state not conclusive of rights of parties); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230
(1945) ("state of domicilliary origin" of parties to divorce rendered in sister state not
bound by latter's judicial finding of domicile in sister state); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1909) (state cannot affect title to land not located therein); Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 666, 668-69 (1892) (judgment penal in nature). See generally H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 208 et. seq. (4th ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH & SCOLES]; Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1949); Sumner, Full Faith and
Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 441 (1955).
67

See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 5 (1942).
text accompanying note 23 supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

68 See

OF

CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 79, Introductory Note (c), at 101 (1971).
69 See N.J. CONST. art. 6, §§ 1-4. The New Jersey supreme court has recognized that
subject-matter jurisdiction "rests solely upon the court's having been granted such
power by the Constitution or by valid legislation." State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122, 160
A.2d 42, 45 (1960) (emphasis in original). Accord, Petersen v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447,
454, 79 A.2d 50, 54 (1951).
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must be made into the scope of the legislative grant of adjudicatory
authority. 70 This question should seemingly be resolved bv an examination of the pertinent statutes. However, when faced with the issue
of the competency of the count\, district courts, one court alluded to
such an analysis, while another totally disregarded it.
The first case dealing with the county district courts' power to
effect service of process out of state was Beca Realty, Inc. v.
Eisberg.7 1 In that case, a realtor sued to recover a brokerage commission allegedly clue from the sale of the defendants' property. After the
sale of their home, the Eisbergs moved to Florida. Since the defendants could no longer be served with process in New Jersey, service
by registered mail was attempted. Upon defendants' failure to respond, a default judgment was entered for plaintiff. Subsequently, the
Eisbergs moved to have the judgment vacated and the service of process quashed. 72 The Bergen County District Court granted the motion and held that the manner of service of process employed by the
plaintiff was not av ailable to obtain jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants in suits instituted in the county district courts.73
In Beca Realty, Judge Huot first considered the due process requirements for maintaining a suit in New Jersey and concluded that
the " 'minimum contacts' " test was clearly met. 74 The defendants argued that although the suit could properly be brought in New Jersey,
"the county district court [wvas] not the proper foruin"; thus, the
court found that
the question raised [was] whether the manner of service of process
used by the plaintiff in this case [was] sufficient for this court to
have jurisdiction. 75
Therefore, although the court spoke in terms of jurisdiction, it was
apparently analyzing the issue in terms of the competency of the
count' district courts.
Judge Huot began the competency analysis by noting that the
county district court's territorial boundaries are determined solely by
the legislature and that these courts generally lack "jurisdiction to
serve process beyond the territorial boundary of the county. "76 Ex70Cf. Smit, supra note 14, at 339.
71 125 N.J. Super. 575, 312 A.2d 516 (Bergen County Dist. Ct. 1973).
72 Id. at 577, 312 A.2d at 517.
73 Id. at 582-84, 312 A.2d at 520-21.
74 Id. at 578, 312 A.2d at 517 (quoting from International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
362 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
75 125 N.J. Super. at 578, 312 A.2d at 517 (emphasis added).
76Id. at 579, 312 A.2d at 518. The court noted that this principle "has been given
limited expansion by the Legislature." Id.
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amining the service rule from this perspective, the court concluded that "the rule is silent on the question of out-of-state service
by the county district court because no out-of-state service is
contemplated.'77 Thus, according to the legislative design, the county
district courts are seemingly not competent to decide cases involving
out-of-state defendants.
The court did not take an absolutist position, however, but went
on to consider the effect of the Winberry decision which had held
that the rule-making power of the supreme court in the areas of practice and procedure was paramount and could not be superseded
by the legislature.78 Recognizing that service of process is such a
matter,79 and reasoning that the supreme court would not knowingly
contravene an obvious legislative intent, Judge Huot felt duty-bound
80
to interpret the rule and the statutes in a complementary manner.
From such an analysis, the court concluded that only an interpretation of the service rule which limited service to within the county
borders would accomplish this aim.81 Moreover, an expansive interpretation of the service rule would have the effect of changing the
character of the county district courts from a legislative court of
limited competency to a court coequal to the constitutional courts
of general jurisdiction. 82 The court concluded, therefore, that before
it would
destroy the geographic boundaries established by the Legislature
for its jurisdiction, a clear expression of such determination should
83
be made by the Supreme Court of this State.

The "clear expression" Judge Huot requested before he would
assume t-hat the count; district coirt had the power to acquire in
personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants came in the form
of the service rule amendment at issue here, rather than a supreme
court adjudication. However, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Katzmann,84 decided subsequent to the rule amendment but interpreting the prior rule, Beca Realty was overruled by the appellate
division. 85 In Sears, the plaintiff instituted suit against Mrs. Katz77Id. at 581, 312 A.2d at 519.
78 Id. at 582-83, 312 A.2d at 520. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
79 125 N.J. Super. at 583, 312 A.2d at 520 (citing Kappish v. Lotsey, 76 N.J. Super.
215, 221, 184 A.2d 17, 20 (Warren County Dist. Ct. 1962)).
80 125 N.J. Super. at 583, 312 A.2d at 520.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 584, 312 A.2d at 520-21.
13 Id. at 584, 312 A.2d at 521.
" 137 N.J. Super. 106, 348 A.2d 193 (App. Div. 1975).
85 Id. at 109, 348 A.2d at 195.
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mann in the Hudson County District Court to recover the amount
due on certain items. Claiming that the debt was her former
husband's responsibility, Mrs. Katzmann served him in New York by
certified mail with a summons and third-party complaint. Defendant
husband moved to quash the service of process. The trial judge
granted the motion, relying upon the authority of Beca Realty, and
the appellate division granted leave to appeal. 8 6 The Sears court, in a
short opinion, found "no constitutional impediment to the application
of our long-arm rule to the county district courts." 87 The court noted
that under Winberry the supreme court's rule-making power over
practice and procedure was exclusive and "not subject to overriding
legislation."-8 8 Since the court viewed the long-arm rule as "purely
procedural," it simply concluded that "[ilts application to the county
district court pursuant to [supreme court rule] cannot be nullified by
our Legislature." 89 Beca Realty's holding was criticized as controverting "the purpose and philosophy of our long-arm rule. '"90 The court
further supported its decision by pointing out that the new rule
amendment was only intended to clarify the issue. 9 1

Thus, as a result of the action of the appellate division, the highest court in New Jersey to discuss the effect of the service rule
amendment to date, the county district courts can obtain jurisdiction
over, and are competent to hear, cases involving out-of-state defen-

dants. This result was reached solely through consideration of the
supreme court's unchecked power over procedure recognized in
Winberry. Therefore, according to the Sears court, the supreme court
has the power to change the competency of the county district courts,

if such can be accomplished through the enactment of a procedural
rule. The enforceability of county district court default judgments
rendered against out-of-state defendants, however, turns upon
whether such a result is in fact legitimate according to the laws of
this state.
ENFORCEABILITY OF COUNTY DISTRICT
COURT DEFAULT JUDGMENTS:
A QUESTION OF LOCAL LAW

The Restatement of Judginents provides that in order for a judgment to be valid it must meet certain requisites: (1) the state must
86 Id.
87 Id.

at 107-08, 348 A.2d at 193-94.
at 109, 348 A.2d at 194.

88 Id.

89Id. at 109, 312 A.2d at 194-95.

-

id. at 109, 312 A.2d at 195.
91Id. at 109-10 n.1, 348 A.2d at 195.
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have jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties; (2)
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided;
(3) the state's procedural requirements for an exercise of the court's
power must be met; and (4) the court rendering the judgment must
be competent to do so. If a judgment fails to meet any of these requisites it is subject to collateral attack in a sister state. 92 Thus, the
(1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
§ 92 (1971). The distinction between direct and collateral attack is a fine one.
See generally Comment, The Value of the Distinction Between Direct and Collateral
Attacks on Judgments, 66 YALE L.J. 526 (1957). See also I A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF
THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 304 (5th ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as FREEMAN]. A direct
attack consists of
[t]he taking of proceedings in the action in which a judgment is rendered to
have the judgment vacated or reversed or modified by appropriate proceedings
either in the trial court or in an appellate court [or] the taking of independent
proceedings in equity to prevent the enforcement of the judgment....
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 11, comment a at 65 (1942). See also 1 FREEMAN,
supra, §§ 307-08; Comment, supra at 530-31.
Any other "attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment" is considered a collateral
attack. Id. at 533; see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 11, comment a at 65-66 (1942). A
collateral attack on a void judgment will lie both in the state of rendition and in sister
states. Id. § 11. A collateral attack most often arises where the holder of a judgment
attempts to enforce it and the defendant pleads the lack of jurisdiction of the court
rendering judgment. Comment, supra at 533-34; 1 FREEMAN, supra, § 309.
To be successful, a collateral attack must show more than a mere error of fact or
law; a collateral attack must show that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction or
that there is a valid defense to the judgment, such as fraud. GOODRICH & SCOLES, supra
note 66, §§ 209, 210-16; F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.6-.8 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as JAMES]. In addition, a defendant may not collaterally attack a judgment for lack
of jurisdiction if he appeared in the court which rendered the adverse judgment to
contest its jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional issue was litigated and decided against
him. A court's ruling on its own jurisdiction then, even if erroneous, is binding upon the
parties to the proceeding and not subject to collateral attack. Durfee v. DuK, 375 U.S.
106, 111-12 (1963); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
376 (1940); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931).
In Baldwin, the Court stated:
Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who
have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that
matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.
We see no reason why this doctrine should not app, in every case where one
voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and whylhe should
not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the
tribunal to which he has submitted his cause.
Id.; see GOODRICH & SCOLES, supra note 66, § 217; JAMES, supra, § 11.6, at 537-38;
92 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 4

OF LAWS

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 9 (1942); Comment, supra at 527-28. But see BESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10(1) (1942) (suggesting exception when "policy under-

lying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting the
court to act beyond its jurisdiction").
Thus, in the Sears case, since third-party defendant Katzmann contested the validity
of the service of process issuing out of the county district court, he is precluded from
collaterally attacking the judgment for lack of jurisdiction in another state, regardless of
the correctness of the appellate division's decision. Although persons in Katzmann's
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competency of the county district courts is an essential requisite to

the enforceability of default judgments in sister states.
Competency-the power of a particular court to decide an
action--"is a question of the local law of the State in which the judgment is rendered.- 93 If under the local law a court is competent "to
render the judgment, the judgment is valid and cannot be collaterally
attacked in that State or in another State."-94 But if the court is not
competent, the judgment is void, collaterally attackable, and not entitled to fill faith and credit in sister states. 95 Thus, "[a] judgment will
not be given greater effect in other states than it has in the state of

rendition. "96
A state's constitution, its statutes, and its decisional law are the
sources normally examined to determine whether a particular court is
competent to render a valid judgment under the local law. 9 7 Perhaps
the leading example is Thompson v. Whitman. 98 This case arose
under the New Jersey Oyster Law which made it illegal for a nonresident "to rake or gather clams, oysters, or shell-fish" within New Jersev waters. 99 This statute imposed a duty on the sheriff to seize violating vessels and immediately inform "two justices of the peace of
the county where such seizure shall have been made" so that a trial
could be held, and if a violation were found, the vessel sold. 100
Thompson, the sheriff of Monmouth County, seized and sold a
sloop belonging to Whitman, a New York resident, and Whitman
later brought an action in trespass in New York against Thompson for
the wrongful taking of his vessel. 10 1 Thompson defended on the
ground that the seizure was authorized by statute and pleaded the
New Jersey judgment which he contended was entitled to full faith
and credit and not subject to collateral attack. 10 2 Whitman, however,
disputed the jurisdictional facts on the face of the judgment, contending that the seizure did not in fact occur in the waters of Monmouth
County and that therefore the justices of the peace who heard the
position would be limited to a direct attack, county district court default judgments
could still be collaterally attacked by a defendant who had not challenged the competency of these courts in New Jersey.
93 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7, comment a at 41 (1942).
94Id.
951d. at 41-42.
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 105, comment a at 316 (1971).
97 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7, comment a at 42 (1942).

98 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
a9Law of Apr. 14, 1846, § 7, [1846] N.J. Laws 181 (repealed 1931).
1 0 Id. § 9, at 181-82.
10185 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 458-59.
102 Id.
at 459.
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case were acting outside of their jurisdiction.' 0 3 The New York court
instructed the jury that the record of the judgment "was only prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated" but refti sed to charge that
the judgment barred the action. 104 The jury found that the seizure
was not in fact made in Monmouth County, gave judgment for
Whitman, and Thompson appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. 105

In an opinion by Justice Bradley, the Court declared that it is
clear that the jurisdiction of the court by which a judgment is rendered in any State may he questioned in a collateral proceeding in
another State, notwithstanding [the full faith and credit clause], and
notwithstanding the averments contained in the record of the
judgment itself'. 106

Applying this principle to the fiacts of the case, the Court concluded
that since the jury found that the vessel was seized in state waters,
but not in the waters of' Monmouth Count\,, and since the statute
specifically provided that the two justices of the peace to hear the
case must be firom the county where ;he vessel was seized, "the justices had no jurisdiction, and the record had no validity. "107 Thus,
upon collateral attack in another state, the judgment was not entitled
to fill faith and credit since the Monmouth County justices of the
peace, under the legislative grant, were not a competent tribunal to
decide the case.
In order to determine the proper powers of a New Jersey court,
one must not only examine the constitution, statutes, and case law,
but also the rules promulgated by the supreme court since that court
has, by. irt e of the 19q47 constitiltion, been delegated certain powers
over the character of inferior courts.108 An analysis of one of these
constitutional grants of power shows that it is very limited and does
not include the ability to change the competence of inferior courts.
For example, under the 1947 constitution the superior court is
granted "original general jurisdiction throughout the State in all
causes. ' '109 And it is constitutionally prescribed that the superior
court be divided into three sections: the appellate division, the lawv
103

Id.

104 1(.

11 Id. at 460.
106Id. at 469.
107Id. at 469-70.
108 See, e.g.,
Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass'n, 13 N.J. 528, 537-38, 100 A.2d
532, 537 (1953); State v. Bigley Bros., 53 N.J. Super. 264, 268-69, 147 A.2d 52, 54-55
(App. Div. 1958).
109 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 3,
2.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 340

division, and the chancery division. 1 10 The supreme court is granted
the power to make rules governing the parts, the number of judges,
and the causes to be heard by each division."' In addition, the constitution provides that the law division and the chancery division
may, to achieve the ends of justice and to dispose of all matters under
the single-unit-of-controversy theory, "exercise the powers and functions of the other division" and grant both "legal and equitable relief"
pursuant to rules promulgated by the supreme court. 112
Although the supreme court is constitutionally mandated to
promulgate rules which will have an effect upon the character of the
divisions of the superior court, this grant of power cannot be construed as allowing the supreme court to change the competence of
those courts. The constitution created the superior court, gave the
court the power to hear all causes, gave the court statewide jurisdiction, and provided for the interrelationship between the law division
and the chancery division as precisely as practicable. It is within
these constitutionally prescribed boundaries that the supreme court
may promulgate rules.
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate the supreme court has,
by rule, provided that
[i]n actions in the Superior Court if the plaintiff's primary right

or the principal relief sought is equitable or probate in nature, he
shall bring the action in the Chancery Division even though legal
relief is demanded in addition or alternative to equitable or probate
relief. 113

This exercise of power is not jurisdictional in nature, but is perhaps
more properly characterized as administrative. In O'Neill v. Vreeland, 11 4 Chief Justice Vanderbilt held that it was error for a law division judge to dismiss a plaintiff's case on the ground that the plaintiff
may have an action in equity but did not have a claim cognizable at
law. 115 It was noted that "the Superior Court is but a single court"
and that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Law and Chancery Divisions is the
110 Id. art. 6, § 3, 3.
illId.
112 Id. art. 6, § 3,
4.
113 N.J.R. 4:3-1(a)(1). This rule further provides:
All other actions in the Superior Court shall be brought in the Law Division,
including all actions in lieu of prerogative writs . . . and all habeas corpus
applications and actions, other than those relating to the custody of infants.
Id.
114

115

6 N.J. 158, 77 A.2d 899 (1951).
Id. at 168, 77 A.2d at 904.
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same." 116 After setting forth the supreme court rule which divided
the actions between the law and chancery divisions, 1 17 the court concluded:
Needless to say this rule does not go to the jurisdiction of the respective divisions of the Superior Court, for the jurisdiction of the

Superior Court is fixed by the Constitution and can be altered
neither by rule of this court nor by act of the Legislature. The rule
is carefully designed to provide a simple mechanism for determin118
ing the proper division in which a case should be tried ....

In addition, this mechanism was intended to be so informal that the
choice of which division to bring a claim in is almost completely in
the hands of the attorney. 1 1 9
Thus, while the 1947 constitution allows the supreme court some
power to change the scope of the actions a court may hear, this grant
of power is specific, limited, and clearly does not extend to the competence of a court. But the New Jersey practitioner or a sister state
called upon to decide the competence of the county district courts as
a matter of New Jersey law must be concerned with the omnipresence and power of Winberry, which held that when a courtpromulgated rule conflicts with a statute, the rule prevails.' 20 The
only restriction upon its rule-making power that the court has recog116 Id. at 165, 77 A.2d at 902.

The rule quoted in Vreeland provided:
All actions which were on September 14, 1948 maintainable in the Court of
Chancery or before the Chancellor, or in the Prerogative Court or before the
Ordinary, shall be brought in the Chancery Division, and all other actions in
the Superior Court shall be brought in the Law Division, bhut this rule shall not
apply to any appeal or matter which is cognizable in the Appellate Division. All
causes on habeas corpus, other than those having to do with the custody of
children, shall be brought in the Law Division. If the primary right of the
plaintiff is equitable or the principal relief sought is equitable, the action is to
be brought in the Chancery Division, even though legal relief is demanded in
addition or as an alternate to equitable relief'.
N.J.R. 3:40-2 (1948). Compare the present rule, which is reprinted at note 113 supra
and accompanying text.
1186 N.J. at 165-66, 77 A.2d at 902.
19 Id. at 166-67, 77 A.2d at 903 (quoting from Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 377-78,
117

66 A.2d 719, 724 (1949)); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Butler, 128 N.J. Super.
492, 495, 320 A.2d 515, 517 (Ch. 1974).
120 5 N.J. at 255, 74 A.2d at 414; see George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374,
381-82, 86 A.2d 8, 12 (1952). Norton involved a statute which required the submission
of the issue of contributory negligence to a jury in cases involving accidents at railroad
crossings which were not properly protected. See Law of Apr. 12, 1910, ch. 278, § 1,
[1910] N.J. Laws 490-91. The court held that this law was superseded by the court
rules dealing with motions for judgments. 8 N.J. at 381-83, 86 A.2d at 12. See N.J.R.
3:41-2 (1948) (involuntary dismissal); N.J.R. 3:50 (1948) (directed verdict).
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nized is that such power is limited to matters of practice and procedure and therefore the court may not "make substantive law
wholesale.' 12 1 Since there is no clear line of demarcation between the
substantive law and the procedural law,' 2 2 and "[a] rule of procedure
may have an impact upon the substantive result and be no less a rule
of procedure on that account," 1 23 it is difficult to predict the limits of
the court's rule-making power. In fact, in Busik v. Levine, 2 4 when
confronted with a challenge to a court rule, the plurality opinion went
so far as to suggest that "the Court may treat [a] subject by a rule
rather than by a judicial decision despite the substantive aspect of the
subject. "125
Despite the fact that procedure and substance are not clearly
definable, and taking cognizance of the attitude of the plurality in
Busik, the service rule amendment still appears to be outside of the
Winberry-type analysis which focuses upon the distinction between
procedure and substance. Jurisdiction occupies a unique position in
the law; it "is neither procedural law nor substantive law.' 126 Under
the Winberry-type analysis, as propounded in Busik, the court will
look to whether it is "palpably inappropriate to think of [the subject
of a court rule] as a matter of procedure in the context of lawmaking"; 12 7 however, "jurisdiction over subject matter [or competence] is conspicuously beyond the procedural realn, resting exclusively on statute or constitution."128 Thus, the theory of the Winberry
decision has no application where the competence of a court is involved. But Winberry's influence is evident when one examines the
appellate division's decision in Sears.
The Sears decision, unlike Beca Realty, did not address the
competence of the county district courts. Instead, the Sears court's
analysis was based solely upon the procedural nature of the long-arm
121 5 N.J. at 248, 74 A.2d at 410.
122 See, e.g.,

Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (1973); State v.

Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 24, 95 A.2d 715, 727 (1953) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). See also
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control
Over judicial Rule-Aaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1,

14-15 (1958).
123 Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (1973).
124 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973).
125 Id. at 373, 307 A.2d at 583.
126 Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata, 80 U. PA. L. REv.
386, 386 (1932). The author notes:
Jurisdiction has nothing to do with either the creation or recognition of substantive rights; it is simply a limitation on the power of a court to act as a court.
Id. (emphasis in original).
:27 63 N.J. at 371, 307 A.2d at 581.
128 State v. Bigley Bros., 53 N.J. Super. 264, 268, 147 A.2d 52, 54 (App. Div. 1958).
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rule. 129 Such an analysis is indisputably correct when the long-arm
rule is applied to the constitutional courts of statewide jurisdiction,
since the purpose of the long-arm rule is to exercise the sovereign's
adjudicatory authority to its fullest extent, subject only to the requirements of due process of law.130 But an application of the longarm rule to the county district courts is significantly different; it fails
to take into account the fact that these courts have legislatively prescribed jurisdictional boundaries. The Sears decision, when viewed in
this manner, is of limited precedential value in the eyes of a sister
state called upon to decide the validity of a county district court default judgment rendered against one of its citizens. In addition, the
precedential value of Sears is further undermined when one considers
that the appellate courts are bound by holdings or rules of the supreme court. 131
The Sears decision inadequately deals with the relationship between the structure of the legislatively created court system and an
extension of jurisdictions; therefore, it may not be an accurate statement of New Jersey law. The present situation involves a court rule,
but in a prior instance when the district courts were faced with a
statutory long-arm provision, the judicial response was similar to
the position taken by the court in Beca Realty. In 1930, the New
Jersey legislature enacted a long-arm statute which provided that
nonresident motorists involved in an accident within the state would,
by virtue of their acceptance of the privilege of driving upon the
state's roads, "make and constitute the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles .. .their agent for the acceptance of process in any civil suit .. .
137 N.J. Super. at 109, 348 A.2d at 194.
Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268, 277 A.2d 207, 209 (1971); Corporate
Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Warren-Teed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 143, 148,
245 A.2d 517, 520 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 52 N.J. 535, 247 A.2d 16 (1968).
For examples of applications of this standard see Cooke v. Yarrington, 62 N.J. 123,
129, 299 A.2d 400, 403 (1973) (contact through possession of New Jersey automobile
license and registration); Roche v. Floral Rental Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 555, 563, 232 A.2d
162, 167 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 26, 237 A.2d 265 (1968) (contact through probability that product would be used in New Jersey); Young v. Gilbert, 121 N.J. Super. 78,
86-88, 296 A.2d 87, 91-92 (L. Div. 1972) (contact by serving drinks to New Jersey patrons).
131 See In re Essex County Grand Jury, 110 N.J. Super. 24, 27, 264 A.2d 253, 254
(App. Div. 1970) (appellate division not free to declare unconstitutional a rule of the
supreme court); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 290, 246 A.2d 11, 17
(App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (appellate division cannot
overrule decisions of supreme court); Kream v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 42
N.J. Super. 307, 308-09, 126 A.2d 385, 386 (App. Div. 1956), aff'd, 24 N.J. 432, 132 A.2d
512, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957) (appellate division bound by supreme court's
adherence to a doctrine).
129
130

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 340

by any resident."' 3 2 The statute further provided that process so
served would be deemed "of the same legal force and validity as if
served . . . personally.' 3 3 The statute did not specify, however,
which courts could hear actions brought against nonresident defendants served in such a manner. In MacPhail v. Nassau,'3 4 the Second
District Court of Paterson, relying upon two prior cases l3 5 and at
length criticizing another,' 3 6 concluded that so far as the district
courts were concerned, the Commissioner's agency merely allowed
the nonresident to be sued in Mercer County, the county where the
office of the Commissioner is located, and no other.' 3 7 Recognizing
that the district courts were not constitutional courts but legislative
courts whose territorial jurisdiction "the legislature may, in a limited
number of cases, or in all cases, increase," the court framed the issue
as whether the legislature, by the passage of the long-arm statute,
intended to increase the territorial jurisdiction of the district
132 Law

of Apr. 7, 1930, ch. 69, [1930] N.J. Laws 295. This act was later amended to

allow the Commissioner to send the summons and complaint and the notice of service
to a process server in the defendant's jurisdiction so that service could be made upon
the nonresident in a manner other than by registered mail. Law of Mar. 16, 1933, ch. 69,
[1933] N.J. Laws 130-31.
13 Law of Apr. 7, 1930, ch. 69, [1930] N.J. Laws 296.
134 14 N.J. Misc. 292, 184 A. 633 (2d Dist. Ct., Paterson 1936).
135 One case was Valentine v. Franklin Surety Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 822, 168 A. 35
(Sup. Ct. 1933) (per curiam), in which the court denied the validity of service of process
upon the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance where the suit was brought in the
District Court of the City of Orange. The court concluded:
The jurisdiction of the District Court was co-extensive with the confines of
the county of Essex, and its process did not run into the county of Mercer.
Id. at 822, 168 A. at 36. The second case was Makohon v. Millers Nat'l Ins. Co., 12 N.J.
Misc. 282, 283-85, 171 A. 513, 513-14 (Hudson County Cir. Ct. 1934), which followed
the Valentine holding.
1a6Gabriel v. Mason Art, Inc., 2 N.J. Misc. 50, 125 A. 125 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (per
curiam) upheld the validity of service of process upon the secretary of state as giving all
district courts, and not just those in Mercer County, jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Id. at 53, 125 A. at 127. At issue was the service provision of a statute passed
in 1900 whereby any domestic corporation or foreign corporation doing business in the
state, upon failing to file a mandatory report or upon the unavailability of that corporation's agent, could be subjected to suit if service were made upon the secretary of state.
Law of Mar. 23, 1900, ch. 124, [1900] N.J. Laws 314-15. The Gabriel court reasoned
that the territorial limits of a court were irrelevant as long as the court had subject-matter
jurisdiction. 2 N.J. Misc. at 53, 125 A. at 126. In support of this position the court stated:
To take any other view would require us to read into the statute a provision
that it should only apply to process issuing out of the Supreme Court. The
territorial jurisdiction of both the Circuit and Common Pleas Courts is limited
to the counties in which such courts are. Such a construction would tend to
defeat the plain legislative intent.
Id. at 53, 125 A. at 126-27.
17 14 N.J. Misc. at 294, 184 A. at 634.
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courts. 13 8 The MacPhail court concluded that the statute was remedial in nature and that the legislature's intent was "to designate an
agent for service of summons" and not "to enlarge the territorial
jurisdiction of District Courts for the service of summons in this class
of cases. -139
A denial of the validity of service of process upon the Commissioner by the First Judicial Court of the county of Burlington was
affirmed by the supreme court in Wall Rope Works, Inc. v. Sperling. 4 0 Sixteen days after the Sperling decision, and as a direct re14 1
sponse to it,
the legislature amended the district court jurisdictional provision to make it clear that the long-arm provisions providing for service upon the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles was in142
tended to extend the territorial jurisdiction of the district courts.
Thus, prior to Sears, when courts were faced with the question of
whether a procedure extending the power of the state over nonresident defendants applied to the district courts, the judicial response was to hold that the procedure was applicable to the courts of
general jurisdiction, but inapplicable to the district courts absent an
express legislative extension of jurisdiction.
The law of New Jersey, then, seems to show that the service rule
amendment promulgated by the supreme court is an invalid extension
of county district court competence with the result that default judgments will be subject to collateral attack both in this state and in sister
states. The legislature has never purported to give the county district
courts the competence to hear cases involving out-of-state defendants
other than in limited circumstances, as is amply demonstrated by the
statutes which created and structured these courts. The supreme
court's service rule amendment cannot accomplish what the legislature never intended. While this fact should be apparent from the 1947
constitution's grant of power to the legislature which provided that
"[t]he inferior courts and their jurisdiction may from time to time be
established, altered or abolished by law,"' 143 the supreme court's unchecked power over practice and procedure has confused the issue,
and one must resort to a historical analysis to buttress this conclusion.
138

Id.

at 293, 184 A. at 634.

139Id. at 295, 184 A. at 635.
140

116 N.J.L. 449, 450, 185 A. 477, 477-78 (Sup. Ct. 1936).

141 See Mann v. Shelzi, 4 N.J. Super. 316, 318, 66 A.2d 886, 887 (App. Div. 1949);

Mohr v. Sonnet, 17 N.J. Misc. 226, 227, 8 A.2d 109, 110 (Perth Amboy Dist. Ct. 1939).
142Law of June 20, 1936, ch. 170, [1936] N.J. Laws 405-06, 408, amending Law of
June 14, 1898, ch. 228, § 29, [1898] N.J. Laws 564 (repealed 1951). See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-7 (1952).
143 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 1,
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As has been demonstrated, wherever the supreme court was
granted the power to promulgate.rules effecting the character or business of a court, the grant has come directly from the constitution, and
the grant has been specific and limited. Moreover, the power granted
has not been of a jurisdictional nature; the court's power has only
included the ability to allocate judicial business between two divisions
of a single court of the same jurisdiction. Thus, examining the constitution, there is no provision which can be construed as granting the
supreme court the power to change the competence of a court.
Winbemj, while a significant factor to overcome when arguing
against the validity of rules promulgated by the supreme court, is not
applicable to an analysis of the service rule amendment. The Winberry-type analysis turns upon the shadowy dichotomy between procedure and substance. But this type of analysis is inapposite when
dealing with a provision effecting the competence of a court. Competence is neither procedural nor substantive, but a unique concept
wholly within the legislative domain.
Finally, in a somewhat analogous situation where the courts were
faced with a general statutory extension of court jurisdiction, the
courts decided that a general long-arm statute could not be applied to
the district courts absent an express legislative extension of jurisdiction. The legislature's response to this oversight was to immediately
amend the jurisdictional provision of the district court act in order to
make it clear that all of the district courts were authorized to obtain
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by service of process upon
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
From this historical analysis it seems clear that the county district courts do not have the competence to hear all cases involving
out-of-state defendants. Therefore, default judgments rendered by
these courts against out-of-state defendants will be subject to collateral attack until the legislature authorizes such a result by statutorily
extending the competence of the county district courts.
CONCLUSION

This Comment has concluded that the supreme court's service
rule amendment which attempted to provide the county district
courts a means by which to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants is invalid and that default judgments rendered against such
defendants pursuant to this rule are collaterally attackable in sister
states. Such a result is mandated since service of process in this context is more than procedure; it is an extension of the competence of
the county district courts. For this reason, the solution to the prob-
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lem of the unenforceability of county district court default judgments
should be forthcoming from the legislature since that is the only body
empowered to change the character of these courts.
In this regard, it is vital to keep the supreme court's rule-making
power in perspective. The court has undertaken a large responsibility
in declaring itself the sole arbiter in matters of practice and procedure. Incumbent in this responsibility is the duty to stay within the
bounds of that power as it was established in Winberry. In fulfilling
this duty, it would be wise for the court to be mindful of the principles of comity, for as Justice Jacobs noted in his dissenting opinion in
State v. Otis Elevator Co. :144
[T]he doctrine of judicial supremacy in rule-making ought, as a
matter of comity towards the Legislature, be accompanied by fair
recognition of important statutory policies in fields which are of
45
special legislative concern. 1

It was with such an idea in mind that the New Jersey rules of
evidence were promulgated. 1 46 Rather than decide whether evidentiary rules were solely within the province of the court's rulemaking
power or wholly a legislative matter,' 47 a State Rules of Evidence
Review Commission was created and "authorized to systematically review and make recommendations to the Legislature concerning rules
of evidence proposed by the Supreme Court, prior to their taking
effect.' 148 The avowed purpose of this commission was to enhance
"[c]o-operation between the legislative and judicial branches of government, and the orderly operation of our judicial system."' 1 49
Apparently this system worked so well for the rules of evidence 150 that in 1970, the commission was changed to the State Rules
of Court Review Commission. 15 1 Its new function was not only to
examine rules of evidence but also
12 N.J. 1, 95 A.2d 715 (1953).
Id. at 25, 95 A.2d at 727 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
146 See 63 N.J. at 367-68, 307 A.2d at 580.
147 See id.
148 Law of July 19, 1968, ch. 183, [1968] N.J. Laws 584-85, as amended, Law of
Nov. 2, 1970, ch. 258, [1970] N.J. Laws 878 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-39 et
seq. (1976)).
149 Law of July 19, 1968, ch. 183, preamble, [1968] N.J. Laws 585, as amended,
Law of Nov. 2, 1970, ch. 258, [1970] N.J. Laws 878 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A-39.1 et seq. (1976)).
150 Cf. 63 N.J. at 374-75, 307 A.2d at 584 (Hall, J., concurring).
151 Law of Nov. 2, 1970, ch. 258, [1970] N.J. Laws 878 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-39.1 et seq. (1976)).
144
145
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any rule of court in effect, or proposed, which the commission considers may call for legislative action to aid in the achievement of
the intended purpose, or the solution of a problem, by means of
152
amendatory, supplemental, revisory or new legislation.

Such a permanent commission would seem to be a satisfactory solution to potential problems with court rules; however, this commis53
sion is, at the present time, inoperative.'
Justice Hall, in his concurrence in Busik v. Levine, suggested
that the use of this commission could resolve future problems in the
gray area between procedure and substance. 154 This would not result
in a return to a pre-Winberry rulemaking system. There is no sugges-

tion that the court should give up its "exclusive power in those fields
in which there can be no reasonable contention that substantive law
is predominantly involved.' 155 While this exclusive power is still not
accepted in all quarters, 1 56 it must be admitted that the court rules
152

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:84A-39.3 (1976).

Letter from New Jersey Legislative Services Agency to author, Apr. 19, 1976,
on file at the Seton Hall Law Review.
154 63 N.J. at 374-75, 307 A.2d at 583-84 (Hall, J., concurring). Justice Hall stated
what approach he felt the court should take when dealing with such areas:
It seems to me .. .that it would be more appropriate in the future for rules
proposed by the court in these overlapping areas to be worked out in advance
cooperatively between the three branches of government, as was done so successfully in the case of the evidence rules. The court would still retain exclusive power in those fields in which there can be no reasonable contention that
substantive law is predominantly involved, as well as, of course, in the areas of
administration of the courts and admission to and regulation of the bar. The
Legislature, by [statute], has provided an adaptable mechanism for this process
by creating a permanent legislative commission called the State Rules of Court
Review Commission "to study and review * * * any rule of court in effect, or
proposed, which the commission considers may call for legislative action to aid
in the achievement of the intended purpose, or the solution of a problem, by
means of amendatory, supplemental, revisory or new legislation." . . . Indeed,
in the light of the substantive aspects of [the rule], the Commission might well
review and consider it with the court, with the view to making a recommendation to the Legislature thereon. In this particular situation I would defer to
ultimate legislative action. In the meantime, the rule should stand.
Id. at 374-75, 307 A.2d at 584 (citations omitted).
155 Id. at 375, 307 A.2d at 584.
15iSee, e.g., N.J. Senate Con. Res. No. 38 (prefiled for introduction in the 1976 session), which would amend the state constitution to make the supreme court's rulemaking power subject to overriding legislation. This proposed legislation would change article 6, section 2, paragraph 3 to read:
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing administration of all courts
in the State and the practice and procedure in all such courts, subject, however,
to such laws as may be enacted by the Legislature governing the said
administration,practice and procedure....
Id. § 1 (emphasis in original).
153
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since Winberry have been extremely progressive and have "stood the
State in good stead.'1 57 It is merely maintained that the court observe
principles of comity when creating court rules that have a substantive
effect, because "[o]ur form of government works best when all
branches avoid staking out the boundaries which separate their

powers. "158
Michael J. Holub
157
158

63 N.J. at 387, 307 A.2d at 590 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
Id. at 373, 307 A.2d at 583.

